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Summary Th e Swamping Problem is one of the standard objections to reliabilism. If one assumes, as reliabilism does, that truth is the only non-instrumental epistemic value, then the worry is that the additional value of knowledge over true belief cannot be adequately explained, for reliability only has instrumental value relative to the non-instrumental value of truth. Goldman and Olsson reply to this objection that reliabilist knowledge raises the objective probability of future true beliefs and is thus more valuable than mere true belief. I argue against their proposed solution to the Swamping Problem that the conditional probability of future true beliefs given knowledge is not clearly higher than given mere true belief.
Th e Conditional Probability Solution to the Swamping Problem is an interesting recent attempt by Goldman and Olsson (2009) to defang an important objection to epistemic reliabilism. According to the Swamping Problem, it cannot be explained why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief if one assumes simple reliabilism about knowledge and epistemic value monism, that is, the claim that truth is the only noninstrumental epistemic value (cf. Kvanvig 2003). On these assumptions, the standard swamping argument takes the following form (cf. Goldman/Olsson 2009):
(S1) Knowledge equals reliably produced true belief (simple reliabilism). (S2) If a given belief is true, its value will not be raised by the fact that it was reliably produced (because of value monism). (S3) Hence: knowledge is no more valuable than unreliably produced true belief.
A good reliabilist solution to the Swamping Problem has to specify what exactly it is about a reliably produced true belief that makes it more valuable than the corresponding unreliably produced true belief, that is, why premise (S2) of the swamping argument is false. 1 To this end, Goldman and Olsson claim that "under reliabilism, the [objective] probability of having more true belief (of a similar kind) in the future is greater conditional on S's knowing that p than conditional on S's merely truly believing that p" (Goldman/Olsson 2009), together with some plausible empirical background assumptions (ibid.). In the following, I will argue for the most radical and straightforward response to the Conditional Probability Solution, namely that the probability of more future true belief simply is not higher conditional on knowledge than conditional on mere true belief.
At the heart of Goldman's and Olsson's solution lies the contrastive probability claim that, for a given epistemic subject S, the probability of future true beliefs of a similar kind (F) is higher if S knows that p instead of merely having a true belief that p. Th eir rationale for that claim is that knowing that p, but not merely truly believing that p, entails the presence of a reliable belief-producing mechanism, which in turn leads to a higher probability of future true beliefs of the same kind-at least given some plausible empirical background assumptions like, for example, the future availability and applicability of the same belief-producing mechanism (cf. Goldman/Olsson 2009). 2 More formally, Goldman's and Olsson's contrastive probability claim can be put as follows:
How are we to evaluate such a contrastive claim about two objective probabilities? Suppose that S actually knows that p. Th en, it will be contrary to fact that S merely truly believes that p in the same situation. So, we have to imagine how probable more future true beliefs of the same kind would be for S, if S did not know but merely truly believes that p in that situation. Th us, Goldman's and Olsson's contrastive probability claim (CPC) seems to have an implicit counterfactual dimension, for it can never
